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Cultural Constructions of Modernity in the World 
Polity 
Matthias Koenig 
In the first years of the 20th century, at the time when Max Weber was about to 
publish his Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, the Chinese scholar and re-
former Kang Youwei, drawing on both Confucian traditions and the utopian lit-
erature of 19th century Europe wrote his Book of the Great Community (Datongshu).1 
While the immediate purpose of this quite astonishing book was to explain the 
failure of half-hearted reform policies in Imperial China and to propose strategies 
for Chinese national recovery, it also contains a more general analysis of social 
inequality as well as a theory of human progress and evolution. One by one, Kang 
thought, humankind would eliminate the boundaries of family, gender, class, occu-
pation, law and nation. Self-centered nation-states would be substituted by larger 
federations, before eventually, under the pressure of a World Parliament, the »Great 
Community« would be achieved. National frontiers would be replaced by a mathe-
matically precise administrative division of the world based on the latitude/longi-
tude grid, all people would be linked to one another by global networks of elec-
tronic communication, all races would blend into one race through migration and 
intermarriage on a global scale, women’s rights would be achieved through the 
elimination of family structures and through strict equality of women and men 
before the law, and the struggles over social inequality resulting from industrializa-
tion would be resolved by the eradication of property and poverty. It was Kang 
himself who considered this vision »too advanced for the times« (Spence 1980,  
p. 73) and, indeed, neither the Emperor’s court officials nor the younger generation 
of intellectuals who later became the carrier group of the Chinese Revolution took 
up his ideas. However, it is not so much the political impact of Kang’s utopian 
ideas, but their underlying awareness of globality coupled with a strong epochal 
consciousness that should attract our interest. While Weber was still trying to come 
to terms with the occidental origins of modern rationality and its »universal cultural 
—————— 
 1  Kang’s book was posthumously published in Chinese in 1935; for the historical context cf. Spence 
1982: 58–74. 
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significance«2, Kang approached its global consequences directly, by envisioning a 
worldwide social order in which Confucianism would be no less uplifted than 
Christianity. Kang’s vision thus articulates modernity as a global condition. 
Putting into brackets the content of Kang’s rather speculative social theory and 
reflecting on the »light of cultural problems« (Weber 1988b, p. 214) by which it is 
inspired, we see in anticipation the enormous problemshift that has taken place in 
sociological theory in the late 20th century. At the core of this problemshift lies the 
historical experience of a decentering of occidental modernity, an experience that 
has given rise to various attempts of »unthinking the social sciences«, to use Im-
manuel Wallerstein’s rather drastic expression.3 This decentering of occidental 
modernity has a temporal, spatial and social dimension. Firstly, as the ongoing debates 
on post-modernity, second, third or reflexive modernity indicate, classical European 
modernity is increasingly regarded as a temporal sequel within a larger epochal 
formation. As a consequence, its presumably universal patterns of social evolution, 
differentiation and integration are seen as historically contingent – hence the con-
temporary revival in historical sociology.4 Secondly, the discussions on globalization 
and the transformation of the nation-state have led to sustained critiques of the 
»methodological nationalism« (Martins 1974) entrenched in sociological theory. 
Against the spatial model of a territorially and nationally bounded societal commu-
nity, the global or the transnational are commended as more adequate levels of 
social theorizing. And thirdly, discourses of post-colonialism, subaltern studies and 
indigenous sociologies have heightened the awareness of non-occidental social 
formations in modernity and have led to an increased self-reflexivity in Western 
sociological discourse (Wittrock 1999). 
While this problemshift in the sociological discourse of modernity clearly sepa-
rates us from Weber with respect to the substantive questions we ask, his theoretical 
agenda of historical comparative macro-sociology has retained and perhaps even 
regained its attraction and therefore merits further theoretical elaboration (Schwinn 
2003). In the past two decades, two promising theoretical approaches have ap-
peared that try to develop the Weberian paradigm in light of the contemporary 
problemshift: the comparative analysis of civilizations and the neo-institutionalist 
analysis of world society. At first glance, these two approaches seem to imply con-
tradictory conceptions of modernity. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, who has been a major 
protagonist in the renaissance of civilizational analysis, has since the 1970s empha-
sized the divergence of modernity’s institutional configurations in the context of 
—————— 
 2 To use the expression from Weber’s »Vorwort« to the revised version of his »Protestantische Ethik« 
and the »Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen«; see Weber 1988a, p. 1. 
 3  See Wallerstein 1991; for a more balanced analysis see Wallerstein et al. 1996.  
 4  For the problematic role of historical sociology with respect to the problemshift in sociological 
discourse of modernity see notably Calhoun 1999.  
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different traditions or, as he later prefers to say, Axial Age civilizations. Conse-
quently, he has proposed the notion of »multiple modernities« that is currently 
attracting much theoretical interest. By contrast, John Meyer and other neo-institu-
tionalists, basing their arguments on evidence from quantitative longitudinal cross-
national comparisons, have repeatedly found convergence, isomorphism and stan-
dardization of formal structures of nation-states, organizations and individual ac-
tors, world-wide. Modernity thus appears in the singular, as a global condition in-
stitutionalized in what Meyer inter-changeably calls »world society« or »world pol-
ity«. 
Yet in spite of these seemingly contradictory conceptions of modernity, I would 
like to argue that both approaches are amenable to theoretical cross-fertilization. To 
develop this argument, I first suggest that both share some common conceptual 
ground in emphasizing the cultural construction, political project and universal 
reference of modernity. Then, in a second step, I identify the gaps and holes in both 
theories that call for further elaboration and propose some lines of inquiry for a 
research agenda that combines the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches. 
And finally, in a third section, I would like to substantiate this argument by drawing 
on evidence from on-going comparative research on cultural constructions of secu-
larity and institutional varieties of secularism in the world polity. 
1. »Multiple Modernities« and »World Polity«: Common 
Conceptual Ground 
To advance the claim that the theoretical approaches related to the notions of 
»world polity« and »multiple modernities« are compatible, it is first of all necessary 
to establish some common conceptual ground. Here, I wish to draw your attention 
to three characteristic points that, in my opinion, are shared by both research pro-
grams. 
Firstly, they see modernity at its most basic level – and in line with Weber’s in-
terpretative sociology – as a cultural construction, with culture being conceptualized as 
an abstract analytical category.5 Eisenstadt’s interest in the cultural dimensions of 
modernity follows from his foundational theory of human action and social order 
which, beyond its structural-functionalist origins, is rooted in an analysis of the 
—————— 
 5  And not as a concrete and bounded world of beliefs, to use William Sewell’s (1999, p. 39) concep-
tual distinction. 
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existential problems of meaning and reflexivity.6 Modernity is understood as a cul-
tural program characterized by a distinctive set of cosmological and ontological 
premises, of which the most important are the awareness of contingency and un-
certainty combined with a faith in the inner-worldly realization of transcendent 
visions (Eisenstadt 2003). Meyer’s conception of modernity is, in turn, based on a 
strictly phenomonological reading of Weber’s theory of rationality. For him moder-
nity is characterized by the construction of cognitive frames of ultimate means, 
means-end-schemes and actor identities by which both action and actors are con-
stituted and legitimized (cf. Meyer 1987). Thus both approaches partake, at least to 
some extent, in the so-called cultural turn in sociological theory, conceiving moder-
nity as a horizon of expectations, an imaginaire or, to use Björn Wittrock’s expres-
sion, as a set of »promissory notes« (2000, p. 37) that explains the increased propen-
sity for social change. Modernity as an epoch is in other words defined by moder-
nity as a project. 
Yet, both approaches clearly go beyond what might so far appear as culturalist 
reductionism by analyzing the institutional frameworks in which modernity as a 
project is enacted. In this regard, they secondly share a strong emphasis of the politi-
cal arena as primary site of institutional projects oriented at variously interpreted 
horizons of expectation. Thus, according to Eisenstadt, the political center acquires 
charismatic qualities under conditions of modernity, and collectivities are increas-
ingly politicized. Meyer argues in a similar vein that it is the State onto whom divine 
agency and sovereignty are devolved and who in the course of his structural expan-
sion has become the major collective actor of societal reconstruction. The primary 
institutional form of modernity is, for both authors, the nation-state with its struc-
tural coupling of political organization and collective identity. By theorizing the 
pivotal role of the nation-state and of the political in the constitution of modern 
society they provide an important correction to the systems-theoretical account of 
functional differentiation.7 For they explain not only why institutional arrangements 
of functional systems, or autonomous value spheres, were established at the level of 
the nation-state, but also why functional differentiation has developed within the 
nation-state in the first place. 
The third point of common conceptual ground that I would like to mention 
concerns the universal reference inherent to modernity. Obviously, this aspect is most 
clearly pronounced by Meyer who sees the nation-state as embedded within, and 
legitimized by, wider institutional fields, first restricted to the European state-system 
—————— 
 6  On this aspect of Eisenstadt’s conceptual framework, which is influenced by Martin Buber’s social 
theory, see Eisenstadt 1995. 
 7 In fact, authors of Luhmannian orientation, are increasingly conceding the pivotal role of the nation-
state and, more generally, of the political for the constitution of modern society; see for instance 
Nassehi 2003, p. 164ff., and Kieserling 2003.  
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and later, by the 19th century, expanded to the world polity. Yet, Eisenstadt equally 
stresses that modernity is the first type of civilization with explicit claims to univer-
sality and world-wide impact. In that respect, the notion of »multiple modernities« is 
perhaps misleading, since what is actually meant are varying cultural interpretations 
and institutional configurations of modernity.8 Going beyond the focus on its occi-
dental context of origin, modernity is thus conceived by both agendas as a global 
cultural condition in which multiple political projects are embedded. 
While these points of common conceptual ground would certainly merit more 
thorough analysis, we may tentatively conclude that theoretical cross-fertilization 
between the two approaches, which share a similar anti-evolutionary historicism, 
seems at least to be possible. 
2. Towards Theoretical Elaboration 
In a next step, I would now like to show that such cross-fertilization is not only 
possible, but also necessary to fill some of the gaps and holes that are characteristic of 
each theory. Thus, while the neo-institutionalist approach fails to explain why mod-
ernity was actively imported by political and intellectual élites in non-occidental 
contexts, Eisenstadt’s approach does precisely that. Highlighting the common 
grammar of Axial Age civilizations that consists in the tension between transcen-
dental and mundane orders, it identifies major cultural factors that account for the 
receptivity of non-occidental contexts to the cultural program of modernity. As a 
consequence, however, it also stresses that different interpretations of that program 
and different institutional projects have emerged depending on the configurations 
of institutional frameworks, social movements, and élites characteristic of various 
civilizations. To put it differently, we have to take into account historical path-de-
pendency of social change in the course of modernity´s global diffusion, an as-
sumption that is actually compatible with the neo-institutionalist approach, but – 
perhaps due to their typically quantitative research design – has not been fully ex-
plored by »world polity« studies so far.9 Conversely, the strength of the neo-institu-
tional research agenda lies in the analysis of the social processes and mechanisms of 
global diffusion that are left rather unspecified in the »multiple modernities« litera-
ture. Modernity as a global condition is not only postulated but analyzed in research 
—————— 
 8 To re-capture a term from comparative political economy; see Hall/Soskice 2001.  
 9  For exceptions see Yasemin N. Soysal (1994), who in her analysis of immigration and integration 
policy in Western Europe takes into account both world polity discourses and different institutional 
trajectories of citizenship regimes; cf. also Jepperson 2002. 
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on inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, epistemic communities 
and social networks that constitute the institutional field of the »world polity« and 
contribute to mechanisms of coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism. 
Assuming that theoretical integration of the »multiple modernities« literature 
and the »world polity« approach is possible and necessary opens up a broad set of 
research questions of which I would like to highlight two general lines of inquiry. 
One line of inquiry may start from assumptions of the world polity approach and 
addresses the question how world-level processes interact with historical path-de-
pendencies at the level of both nation-states and civilizations. Thus, it has been a 
core proposition of neo-institutionalism that in highly rationalized institutional 
fields formal structure and activity structure are de-coupled. Returning to Kang You-
wei and his Confucian contemporaries for a moment, we may note that decoupling 
has not only been endemic to modernity’s global diffusion, but also highly reflexive; 
like in other non-occidental contexts, the Chinese and Korean reform movements 
have combined universal references to modernity with the maintenance of tradition 
as articulated in semantic schemes such as »Eastern spirit – Western technology«. 
To explain the actual degree of decoupling, we need to know the cultural and social 
factors accounting for resistance against transnational expectancy structures, their 
local adaptatation or their full implementation within the activity structure, and it is 
at this point that configurational analysis might step in.10 The interaction of world-
level processes with institutional path-dependencies can furthermore be explored 
with respect to the institutional contradictions inherent to world-polity precepts; these 
create opportunity structures for diverging institutional projects pursued by intel-
lectual and political élites under conditions of different national or civilizational 
frameworks. Finally, the very content of world-polity discourses may also perpetuate 
or even generate cultural differences, for instance by cognitive and normative 
frames reifying and legitimizing sub-national collective actor identities. In sum, this 
line of inquiry would go beyond the one-sided assertions that social differences 
were either simply internal products of modern world society or remnants of tradi-
tional civilizational patterns. Rather the multi-causality of social change in the con-
texts of both the world polity and national or civilizational institutional frameworks 
would be stressed. 
Yet, another line of inquiry can be pursued as well. Starting from the assump-
tion of existing institutional varieties of modernity, we can trace changes of cogni-
tive and normative expectancy structures at the world polity level. Thus, the incor-
poration of non-occidental nation-states in international organizations has, espe-
cially in the course of de-colonization, considerably changed concepts of state sov-
—————— 
 10 For a similar attempt to elaborate the neo-institutionalist approach see, in the context of Internatio-
nal Relations, Acharya 2004.  
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ereignty, national self-determination and human rights. The content of world cul-
ture is thereby evolving beyond its occidental origins. In addition, the analytical 
tools developed by neo-institutionalist world polity research might help to under-
stand the global dynamics of civilizations. As the global diffusion of Islamic law, 
politics, economy, and religion suggests, civilizations provide distinctive frameworks 
within which mechanisms of mimetic, normative, and coercive isomorphism oper-
ate. Against this background, one might even explore the hypothesis of the emer-
gence of multiple world polities. 
Both lines of inquiry could form part of a research agenda that, in elaboration of 
Weber’s project of historical comparative macro-sociology, may contribute to em-
pirically founded middle-range theories of cultural constructions and institutional 
varieties of modernity in the world polity. 
3. Cultural Constructions of Secularity and Institutional Varieties 
of Secularism 
Let me now spell out some preliminary elements of this research agenda with re-
spect to what I propose to call a sociology of the secular. A sociology of the secular has, 
in my view, high strategic value for theory-building, as it allows to discern a central 
aspect of cultural constructions of modernity and its political projects (see also Asad 
2003). In view of the above-mentioned problemshift in the sociological discourse of 
modernity, this research agenda consists of two dimensions: firstly, a reflexive 
analysis of sociological knowledge and its implicit and explicit categories of the 
»secular« – for indeed the »secular« is the »social« as conceived by classical sociology 
(Milbank 1990); and secondly, a historical-comparative analysis of cultural con-
structions of »secularity« and institutional varieties of »secularism«. In the following, 
I restrict myself to the second dimension, in order to exemplify the leverage gained 
by combining the »multiple modernities« approach with »world polity« theory. At 
the outset, I wish to clarify the concepts of »secularism« and »secularity« which are 
highly entrenched in the Christian background of occidental modernity (see Matthes 
1995). 
The concept of »secularism« primarily denotes the institutional project of differ-
entiation between politics and religion within the modern nation-state. In early 
modern Europe, this project has taken the form of an institutional separation of 
what in medieval society was conceived as »secular« and »spiritual« authorities, of 
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State and Church.11 At a more fundamental level, the institutional project of 
separating politics and religion was rooted in a cultural construction of »secularity«, 
understood as the social time-space within which both »politics« and »religion« are 
constituted. The imagination of an unlimited time-space of inner-worldly activism is 
in fact a major aspect of the break-through to modernity. From within Christian 
Axial Age culture, it is constructed on the conceptual grounds of the saeculum as an 
epoch within a larger narrative of redemption and of the civitas terrena as political 
metaphor for the mundane sphere. While this social time-space has become succes-
sively equated with the »nation«, »religion« has emerged as a new conceptual cate-
gory with both generic (»religion«) and relativistic meaning (»a religion«/»religions«), 
which now signified a social phenomenon distinctive from other social systems and 
was read back into history to construct narratives of »secularization«.12 
Already within its European context of origin, »secularism« has emerged in dif-
ferent institutional varieties as a function of confessional cleavage structures, rang-
ing from statist »laïcité franco-française«, over German-type State-Church-corpora-
tism to national churches. However, all these institutional arrangements of religion 
and politics were embedded in a similar cultural construction of secularity, which is 
distinctive from those that emerged beyond Europe and gave rise to different in-
stitutional varieties of secularism. The American model of combining a strong in-
stitutional separation of State and Church with a low degree of differentiation be-
tween politics and religion, is perhaps the best-known case in point.13 Of course, 
further institutional varieties may be expected beyond occidental modernity. 
While this is not the place to analyze the cultural constructions of secularity and 
institutional varieties of secularism in historical detail, I briefly wish to compare 
three cases which are in different ways embedded in the world polity, yet equally 
reflect contemporary transformations of the classical model of secular nation-state-
hood that have occurred at that level. These transformations are epitomized by a 
strong institutionalization of individual human rights, including those to freedom of 
religion, combined with the institutionalization of sub-national collective identity 
frames, including religious ones. As a consequence political organization and collec-
—————— 
 11  It should be noted that in the course of the State’s project of societal rationalization, the distinction 
between »secular« and »spiritual« law became actually blurred, since the State assumed authority over 
both; cf. Berman 2004, and Pizzorno 1987. 
 12 Both Eisenstadt and Meyer are quite sensible to this point. It is worthwhile to quote Meyer at length: 
»There is a tendency to think of Christendom and the Church as what we would now call a religious 
system, reading back into history the more specialized notions we now attach to the term ›religion‹. 
(…) Christendom, more reasonably, is seen through earlier (and probably modern) Western history 
as a much less differentiated, specialized and organizationally structured system: more a polity than a 
›religion‹ (in the modern sense)«, Meyer 1989, p. 401. 
 13  For the importance of the European-American difference within the sociological discourse of 
modernity see notably Wagner 1999.  
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tive identity, State and Nation, are becoming de-coupled and public expressions of 
religious identities legitimized world-wide (Koenig 2003; 2005). 
Within the Western European context of post-Christian modernity, this re-defini-
tion of secularism, understood as the state’s function not only to grant religious 
liberty, but also to promote religious diversity, has opened up new possibilities to 
contest established institutional arrangements between politics and religion. The 
French discourse on a potential »laïcisation de la laïcité«, the German debate about a 
pluralization of state-church corporatism and the British discussion about Anglican 
disestablishment, all triggered by the presence of Islam in Europe, are indicators of 
an on-going institutional change in that respect. However, given the importance of 
imaginations of secularity for national identities in Western Europe, publicized 
religious diversity continues in all three cases to be conceived as challenge to the 
secular nation-state by political élites. As due to their strong involvement in network 
structures and carrier organizations of the world polity de-coupling between formal 
structure and activity structure is problematic, conflict over the inclusion of religion 
in the public sphere increases and contestations of the very category of religion 
become endemic (Beckford 1999). 
In the East Asian context of post-Confucian modernity, the world polity frames of 
secular statehood have had a quite different impact. Here the notion of religious 
diversity can easily be localized as a symbol of secular national identity due to the 
long-established tradition of recognizing a co-existence of »Three Teachings« (Pye 
1995). South Korea has been a particularly interesting case in that respect. Globally 
legitimated notions of »religious diversity« (chonggyo dawon chuoi) were exploited by 
the State in projecting national identity in the process of democratization (Koenig 
2000). At the same time, pressure to organizational restructuring of various tradi-
tions increased. As the tension between transcendental and mundane orders had 
been expressed rather differently within Confucian civilization and lacking an insti-
tutional distinction of »secular« and »spiritual« authorities, the construction of mod-
ern »religion«, a term translated in to the vernacular (chonggyo) by the end of the 19th 
century, was rather problematic. It gives an interesting twist to Weber’s Protestant 
Ethic thesis, to note that it was Protestantism who, due to its missionary success and 
its anti-Japanese stance in the period of colonialism, served both as a carrier of 
nation-building and as organizational model of »religion« according to which other 
Korean traditions were re-structured. Confucianism has, in turn, become subject to 
projects of active »religionization«, such as those promoted by the Confucian Acad-
emy in Seoul in the 1990s but also by the state in its attempt to classify religions 
both as individual beliefs and membership organizations. The institutionalization of 
secular statehood is thus paradoxically leading to a production of religions, thus 
giving rise to new potential conflict over freedom of religion. 
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The third case, coming from the Central Asian context of post-Islamic and post-commu-
nist modernity is of particular interest to the analysis of constitutional contradictions 
within the world polity.14 The Kyrgyz Republic, whose political élites took a strong 
orientation towards Western democracy after the break-down of the Soviet Union, 
has seen herself caught between contradictory cognitive and normative expecta-
tions. Against the background of late, and in fact Russian-led, Islamization in the 
19th century and Jacobin secularism during the Soviet-Union, granting rights to 
religious liberty was an important aspect to gain external legitimacy during post-
communist state building, with pressure exercised notably by American-based fun-
damentalist-Protestant missionaries through both political and economic incentives. 
This policy, however, made the Kyrgyz Republic a refuge for Islamic fundamentalist 
groups, who were persecuted in neighboring Uzbekistan, with the result of interna-
tional criticism for deficiencies in sovereign security policy. In this context, the 
formal adoption of a globally legitimated discourse of »religious diversity«, indicated 
by various government initiatives to present Central Asia in general and the Kyrgyz 
Republic in particular as crossroads of civilizations, is strongly de-coupled from 
emerging conflict at the level of activity structure. 
4. Conclusion 
By way of conclusion, please allow me to make two additional remarks. Firstly, if 
indeed, as I have tried to show, a theoretical integration of world polity and multiple 
modernities approach is possible and necessary, attention of macro-sociological 
research may be shifted in directions that go beyond the discussion on convergence 
versus divergence. The focus on outcomes of social change within units of analysis 
conceived as fixed social entities – nation-states or civizilations – may be substituted 
by a comparative focus on processes of cultural boundary shifts and relational 
mechanisms of institutional change through which such entities are constituted and 
continuously transformed.15 
Secondly, to come back to my introductory remarks on the problemshift in so-
ciological discourse of modernity, we may note an additional dimension of decen-
tering European modernity. As reflexive analyses of sociological knowledge show, 
modernity and secularity have implicitly been understood as normative concepts 
firmly entrenched within post-Christian cultural frameworks. Understanding the 
—————— 
 14 Here I report on some evidence from recent field-work in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2004; for an 
analysis of the language factor in the process of nation-building cf. Koenig 1999.  
 15  On the relational ontology implied in this agenda see e.g. Tilly 2002.  
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contemporary re-configurations of politics and religion, of which I have only hinted 
at some of the less violent cases, probably requires a more dialogic opening of occi-
dental social sciences to other modes of conceiving of the secular – or indeed of the 
social. 
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